INTRODUCTION
The sixth amendment guarantees the "right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury."' This right has been vigorously scrutinized in criminal proceedings involving the death penalty 2 and in situations where the defendant and the victim are of different races. 3 The Supreme Court recently examined these issues in Turner v. Murray 4 and held that a black defendant accused of murdering a white store owner was entitled to have prospective jurors questioned during the voir dire as to their possible racial biases. 5 The Turner Court ultimately vacated the defendant's death sentence 6 while upholding the jury's finding of guilt. 4 106 S. Ct. 1683 Ct. (1986 . 5 Id. at 1688. The Supreme Court recently stated that "without an adequate voir dire the trial judge's responsibility to remove prospective jurors who will not be able impartially to follow the court's instructions and evaluate the evidence cannot be fulfilled." Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981) .
6 Turner, 106 S. Ct. at 1688. 7 Id. at 1689.
713
The Aldridge dissent, written by Justice McReynolds, addressed the overprotectionist arguments forecasted by Chief Justice Hughes. 17 Justice McReynolds rejected the majority's argument that black defendants could receive less equal treatment than their white counterparts in stating that in a jurisdiction like the District of Columbia, where the colored race is accorded all the privileges and rights under the law, that are afforded the white race, and especially the right to practice in the courts, serve on the jury, etc., we are of the opinion that there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in refusing to permit the question to be answered by thejurors.'a mences I cannot do anything about it-but I am going to continue the case and have other counsel appointed if you gentlemen intend to make a color issue here. You know, I believe in equal rights but I do not believe in preferential rights. Id. On appeal, the circuit court reversed the defendant's subsequent conviction in light of Aldridge. Id .
The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Carter, 440 F.2d 1132 (6th Cir. 1971), applied Aldridge to a non-capital case involving a black man accused of bank robbery. At trial, the judge disallowed defense counsel's attempt to explicitly inquire into the potential racial prejudices of thejurors. Id. at 1133. The Sixth Circuit held that this refusal constituted reversible error since "anything but a direct inquiry as to the presence of racial prejudice will fail to satisfy the essential demands of fairness necessary to ascertain whether or not ajuror has a conscious or unconscious prejudice against a defendant because of his race or color." Id. at 1134-35. Herein, the court disregarded the prosecution's arguments that the record was void of evidence of a racially prejudiced jury panel. Id. at 1134.
The South Carolina Supreme Court narrowly defined the extent of the Aldridge holding in State v. Brooks, 235 S.C. 344, 111 S.E.2d 686 (1959), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 300 (1961) . The Brooks defendant, a black man, was accused of raping a white woman in Greenville, South Carolina. Id. at 346-48, 111 S.E.2d at 688. At trial, the defense counsel requested the inclusion of several questions during voir dire. Id. at 349, 111 S.E.2d at 689. The judge allowed a general inquiry into the potential racial biases of the jurors. Id., I ll S.E.2d at 689. The accepted question asked: "Would you have any prejudice against a defendant because of his color?" Id., 111 S.E.2d at 689. The judge, however, disallowed explicit questioning about further prejudices arising from the fact that the crime charged was interracial rape. Id., 111 S.E.2d at 689. The refused question was: "Would it take less evidence for you to render a verdict against a colored person charged with rape or assault with intent to ravish a white female than it would for you to render a verdict against a white person charged with rape or assault with intent to ravish a colored female?" Id., 111 S.E.2d at 689. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the trial court's refusal to allow the more specific question to be asked during voir dire was not an error for two reasons. First, the disallowed question was sufficiently included in the scope of the permitted inquiry into the potential racial prejudices of the jurors arising from the defendant's race. Id., 111 S.E.2d at 689. Second, the court stated that "such examination ofjurors, its nature and extent, are within the discretion of the trial judge." Id., 111 S.E.2d at 689. Brooks, therefore, reflected the South Carolina Supreme Court's unwillingness to extend Aldridge to include mandatory inquiry into the particular racial biases ofjurors which may arise from a crime such as interracial rape. See infra text accompanying notes 71-73 forJustice Marshall's arguments about the unique nature of interracial rape in his dissent from the 1976 certiorari denial of Dukes v. Waitkevitch, 536 F.2d 469 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 932 (1976) . 17 Aldridge, 283 U.S. at 315-18 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). 18 Id. at 316 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
Justice McReynolds argued that there was no evidence in the Aldridge trial record that prejudice affected any juror's decision. 1 9 In fact, it was "not even argued that considering the evidence presented there was room for reasonable doubt of guilt." 20 The United States Supreme Court again emphasized the importance of voir dire inquiry into the racial prejudices of prospective jurors in the 1973 decision of Ham v. South Carolina. 2 1 The defendant in Ham was a black man accused of a non-capital, non-violent offense. Ham's trial, arising from a charge of marijuana possession in South Carolina, was seemingly aggravated by the fact that he was a well-known civil rights activist. 2 2 In an opinion written by Justice Rehnquist, the Court cited the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 2 3 and reversed the South Carolina Supreme Court's holding that voir dire queries into racial prejudices were not required even if timely requested. The Ham Court, however, upheld the trial judge's denial of defense counsel's requested inquiry into the prospective jurors' prejudices against facial hair. 25 The Court cited Aldridge as representing "the traditionally broad discretion accorded to the trial judge in conducting voir dire" 26 (1974) . The defendant in Grant was a black postal worker accused of stealing articles from the mail service. 494 F.2d at 121. Soon after her arrest, the defendant confessed to taking the items in question. During voir dire, the trial judge did not allow defense counsel to inquire into the possible racial biases of the prospective jurors. Id. In affirming the resulting conviction, the Second Circuit stated that "in view of the overwhelming evidence of appellant's guilt, the error here, if any, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 122. 21 409 U.S. 524 (1973) . Two of the voir dire inquiries proposed by the defense counsel related to possible racial prejudice against the defendant. The third request inquired into potential biases against men, like the defendant, who have beards. The fourth request inquired into potential biases arising from pretrial publicity. On remand, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld its prior ruling. 3 7 The court analyzed the Ham decision and distinguished its facts from those of Ross v. Massachusetts. 3 8 Ham, according to the court, did not mandate voir dire inquiry into possible racial prejudices "in all State criminal trials when the defendant is black (or from some other racial minority group), even when the defendant has requested such an inquiry and the statutory framework permits questioning to discover bias." 3 9 Rather, the court found voir dire inquiry necessary in Ham because Ham was a wellknown civil rights leader who "would have been a prominent target for [juror] prejudice." 40 The court found that no similar heightened expectation of racial prejudice existed for the Ross v. Massachusetts defendant.
1
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded its decision by announcing the standards to be used in future cases similar to Ross v. Massachusetts. The court stated:
The issue of racial prejudice may not be apparent at the outset of a case but may become evident during the trial. Therefore, when a defendant requests that the prospective jurors be questioned about their racial prejudice, the judge should make specific inquiries of counsel concerning the racial aspects of the case .... If it appears from such preliminary inquiries that the case might reasonably be expected to present factors involving possible racial prejudice, then the judge should question the prospective jurors in this area.
42
34 The requested inquiry which was denied by the trial judge was: "Are there any of you who believe that a white person is more likely to be telling the truth than a black person?" Commonwealth v. Ross, 363 Mass. at 667 n.4, 296 N.E.2d at 812 n.4. 55 The Court concluded that such circumstances suggested the need for a special voir dire inquiry into racial prejudice more than did the circumstances in Ristaino, 5 6 as the latter "did not suggest a significant likelihood that racial prejudice might infect Ross' trial." '5 7 In addition to its strict factual adherence to Ham, the Court ardently rejected the adoption of a per se inquiry into the racial prejudices of prospective jurors in all criminal actions involving a defendant and a victim of different races.
58
The Ristaino majority, however, conceded a major point in a footnote. 59 After repeating the Ristaino holding, Justice Powell noted that "the wiser course generally is to propound appropriate questions designed to identify racial prejudice if requested by the defendant. Under our supervisory power we would have required as much of a federal court faced with the circumstances here." 60 Therefore, if Ristaino had arisen in federal district court the Supreme Court would have reached the opposite result.
Justice Marshall's dissent in Ristaino was succinct. After quoting from his dissent in the Ross v. Massachusetts denial of certiorari, 61 the Justice stated that the Ristaino majority opinion "emphatically confirms that the promises inherent in Ham and Aldridge will not be 53 Id. at 596-97. 54 Id. at 597. 55 Id. The Court stated that such voir dire questioning, when requested, was "necessary to meet the constitutional requirement that an impartial jury be impaneled." Id.
56 Id. at 597-98. The circumstances in Ristaino cited as important by the First Circuit included the fact that the victim was white and the defendants were black and the fact that the victim was a security guard. Id. at 597. 58 Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 596 n.8. In its rejection of the use of a per se rule, the Court used the following analysis:
We note that such a per se rule could not, in principle, be limited to cases involving possible racial prejudice. It would apply with equal force whenever voir dire questioning about ethnic origins was sought, and its logic could encompass questions concerning other factors, such as religious affiliation or national origin. In our heterogeneous society policy as well as constitutional considerations militate against the divisive assumption-as a per se rule-that justice in a court of law may turn upon the pigmentation of skin, the accident of birth, or the choice of religion.
Id.(citations omitted).
59 Id. at 597 n.9. 60 Id. The Dukes defendant, who was black, was accused of interracial rape, armed robbery, kidnapping, and assault with a deadly weapon. 6 4 The Dukes trial judge refused to allow specific voir dire inquiry into the potential racial biases of the prospective jurors. 65 The state appellate court upheld the resulting conviction, and the defendant's appeal request was, in turn, denied by the Massachusetts SupremeJudicial Court.
6
The federal district court subsequently granted the defendant's habeas corpus writ, 6 7 and the First Circuit, which the Supreme Court had recently reversed in Ristaino, 68 reversed. 69 In its reversal, the First Circuit rejected the defendant's attempts to distinguish the interracial assault charge at issue in Ristaino from the interracial rape charge at issue in Dukes. That promise is the fundamental guaranty of a fair trial before an impartial jury.
Three circuit court cases arising after Ristaino and Dukes reflect the great amount of discretion consistently granted the trial judge in the voir dire process. The Eighth Circuit decided two cases in 1978 which appeared to establish the rule that post-Ristaino trial courts have few limits on the amount of discretion exercised in the conduct 75 The defendant challenged the decision on the grounds that the trial court's refusal to allow specific voir dire inquiries about race requested by the defendant constituted reversible error. 76 The trial court included some questions concerning racial bias in the voir dire, 77 and, according to the Eighth Circuit, these inquiries satisfied the district court's "non-constitutional duty to inquire as to possible racial bias on the jury panel when the defendant is a member of a racial minority group."
' 7 8 The circuit court referred to an earlier Supreme Court case in stating that "as in Ristaino, the issue of race was not 'inextricably bound up with the conduct of the [Bell] trial'. . . . Consequently, the district court was under no constitutional obligation to probe prospective jurors for signs of racism."
79
Two weeks after deciding Bell, the Eighth Circuit ruled on a second case involving the voir dire process in the trial of a black defendant. 80 In United States v. Bowles, the district court found the defendant guilty of distributing the drug phencyclidine. 8 1 During the voir dire, defense counsel requested inclusion of a question about the effect of the defendant's race on thejurors' opinions. 8 2 The trial judge refused. 83 
77
The following questions were included in the voir dire: Do any of you have any prejudices about giving a fair trial to a person of a minority race? Have any of you had any untold experiences with black people, any experiences that would be unusual of any kind that might shade your thinking in a situation of this kind? Do any of you think that you might give more credibility to the testimony of a witness who was white than to a witness who was black? Id.
78 Id 
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proposition that voir dire conduct is within the judge's discretion. 8 5 Limits on this discretion exist, however, since "it by no means follows that where, as here, the defendant is a Negro, the district judge may with impunity refuse to make appropriate inquiry of the jury panel as to possible racial bias, and then justify such refusal by asserting the exercise of discretion. ing Mexican aliens into the United States. 97 At trial, the court denied the defense counsel's request to inquire into the possible racial or ethnic prejudices of the prospective jurors. 98 On appeal, the Supreme Court analyzed the doctrines emerging from Ristaino and Ham and applied them to the facts of RosalesLopez. 99 The Court distinguished Ham from Ristaino, arguing that issues of racial prejudice were inseparable from Ham's trial alone. 1 00 Therefore, only in Ham was it reversible error for the trial court to fail to examine the prospective jurors about potential racial biases. 10 When a case contains racial issues which are separable from the trial, as in Ristaino, then it is within the trial court's discretion to decide whether to require an inquiry into racial prejudice. 1 02 The Court, however, acknowledged the major concession made in footnote nine of Ristaino by stating that "[i]n the federal court system, we have indicated that under our supervisory authority over the federal courts, we would require that questions directed to the discovery of racial prejudice be asked in certain circumstances in which such inquiry is not constitutionally mandated."' 0 3
In affirming the defendant's conviction, the Court rejected the use of the cost-benefit approach to racial bias voir dire inquiry used by ChiefJustice Hughes in Aldridge.
1 0 4 ChiefJustice Hughes argued that the benefits of a more highly scrutinized jury panel far outweighed the potential costs of a longer voir dire process. In order that this defendant shall have a fair and impartial jury to try the charges against him, it is necessary that we address certain questions to the panel to make sure that there are no underlying prejudices, there are no underlying reasons why you can't sit as a fair and impartial juror if chosen to do so in this case. Id. at 186. The other questions asked by the judge included: "Do any of you have any feelings about the alien problem at all?"; "Do any of you have any particular feeling one way or the other about aliens or could you sit as a fair and impartial juror if you are called upon to do so?"; "Does any reason occur to you why you could not sit in this case as a fair and impartial juror, any reason whatsoever?" Id.
99 Id. at 189-92. discussing this approach, the Court said that the major concern should be "the appearance ofjustice in the federal courts." 10 6 The Court stated further that voir dire inquiry into racial prejudice does not need to be granted "where there is no rational possibilty of racial prejudice. But since the courts are seeking to assure the appearance and reality of a fair trial, if the defendant claims a meaningful ethnic difference between himself and the victim, his voir dire request should ordinarily be satisfied."
10 7
In Rosaes-Lopez, the Supreme Court also analyzed rulings ot various circuit courts. 108 The Court acknowledged a split between the circuit courts, with some courts adopting a per se rule' 0 9 -"requiring reversal whenever the trial judge fails to ask a question on racial or ethnic prejudice requested by a defendant who is a member of a minority group" I°0-and other courts rejecting a per se rulewherein "a trial judge is required to pose such a question only where there is some indication that the particular case is likely to have racial overtones or involve racial prejudice."'II
The Supreme Court in Rosales-Lopez expressly rejected the per se rule in favor of a three-part standard implied from its earlier holdings in Aldridge and Ristaino. 112 The Court contended that inquiry into the possible prejudices of the prospective jurors is necessary: 1) "when requested by a defendant";"1 3 2) when the defendant has been accused of a violent crime; and 3) when "the defendant and the victim are members of different racial or ethnic groups." In affirming the trial court's denial of voir dire inquiry into the racial or ethnic prejudices of the prospective jurors, the Rosales-Lopez Court focused on the fact that the defendant had never "argued that the matters at issue in his trial involved allegations of racial or ethnic prejudice .... "115 The Court applied two parts of its espoused three-part standard 1 6 in pointing out that the alleged offense in Rosales-Lopez was not violent and did not involve a perpetrator and a victim of different races or ethnic groups.'" 7 Justice Rehnquist, joined by ChiefJustice Burger, concurred." 18 Justice Rehnquist interpreted the majority's three-part standard "as creating a per se rule requiring reversal of any criminal conviction involving a violent crime' between members of different racial or ethnic groups if the district court refused to voir dire on the issue of racial prejudice." 1 9 Justice Rehnquist was most disturbed by the Court's use of ambiguous terms such as "violent crime" and "different racial or ethnic groups."' 120 Justice Rehnquist also stated that he would give more discretion to the trial court in determining the appropriateness of voir dire inquiry into racial prejudice. 121 Justice Rehnquist concluded his opinion by implying that increases in judicial discretion may lead to more equitable results. 122 the decision as to whether the total circumstances suggest a reasonable possibility that racial or ethnic prejudice will affect the jury remains primarily with the trial court, subject to case-by-case review by the appellate courts.
Id.
The Court fashioned a different standard in response to the question of when racial prejudice inquiries at voir dire should be required in cases involving non-violent crimes perpetrated by defendants on victims of the same racial or ethnic group. Using for support the denial of such inquiries in Ristaino, which involved a violent crime, the Court stated that "[o]nly when there are more substantial indications of the likelihood of racial or ethnic prejudice affecting the jurors in a particular case does the trial court's denial of a defendant's request to examine the jurors' ability to deal impartially with this subject amount to an unconstitutional abuse of discretion." Id. at 190. The Court further explained this standard in stating that the defendant should make the determination of whether or not he would prefer to have the inquiry into racial or ethnic prejudice pursued. Failure to honor his request, however, will be reversible error only where the circumstances of the case indicate that there is a reasonable possibility that racial or ethnic prejudice might have influenced the jury.
Id. at 191 (footnote omitted).
115 Id. at 192. The Court in this statement seems to ignore the distinction between the existence of racial or ethnic prejudice during the commission of a crime and the presence of such prejudice during a trial. Justice Stevens dissented in Rosales-Lopez and was joined byJustices Brennan and Marshall. 12 4 Following his rejection of the "special circumstances" approach used by the majority, Justice Stevens discussed the applicability of Aldridge. 125 Justice Stevens argued that the Aldridge result was strengthened by the fact that it was supported by decisions in state cases which arose prior to Aldridge. 126 Furthermore, Aldridge expressly applied to all races and ethnic groups, not just blacks. 127 As Justice Stevens noted, the Aldridge Court held that " '[t]he right to examine jurors on the voir dire as to the existence of a disqualifying state of mind, has been upheld with respect to other races than the black race, and in relation to religious and other prejudices of a serious character.' "128
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF TURNER v. MURRAY
Willie Lloyd Turner, a black man, entered a Franklin, Virginia jewelry store on July 12, 1978 with a sawed-off shotgun. 12 9 W. Jack Smith, Jr., the store's owner, another store employee, and two customers were present in the store when Turner entered.' 30 Smith, a white man, set off a silent alarm as he gathered together the jewelry and money demanded by Turner.' 3 ' The alarm signal was picked Before any citizen may be permitted to sit in judgment on his peers, some inquiry into his potential bias is essential. Such bias can arise from two principal sources: a special reaction to the facts of the particular case, or a special prejudice against the individual defendant that is unrelated to the particular case. Much as we wish it were otherwise, we should acknowledge the fact that there are many potential jurors who harbor strong prejudices against all members of certain racial, religious, or ethnic groups for no reason other than hostility to the group as a whole. Even when there are no "special circumstances" connected with an alleged criminal transaction indicating an unusual risk of racial or other group bias, a member of the Nazi Party should not be allowed to sit in judgment on a Jewish defendant. Id. at 196-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). up by the police, 132 and, when Officer Alan Bain arrived at the jewelry store to investigate, he was disarmed by Turner. 1 3 3 Turner then fired a shot towards the rear of the store and threatened to shoot the store's occupants if any other police officers arrived.
4
Without warning, Turner shot Smith in the head after a police siren sounded. 3 5 Turner then shot Smith in the chest twice, killing him. 13 6 Bain subsequently disarmed Turner and placed him in custody.
3 7
Turner was indicted on "charges of capital murder, use of a firearm in the commission of a murder, and possession of a sawedoff shotgun in the commission of a robbery."' 1 3 8
In preparation for the voir dire, Turner's counsel submitted several statements and questions to the trial judge, including: "The defendant, Willie Lloyd Turner, is a member of the Negro race. The victim, W. Jack Smith, Jr., was a white Caucasian. Will these facts prejudice you against Willie Lloyd Turner or affect your ability to render a fair and impartial verdict based solely on the evidence?"' 1 3 9 The judge refused to ask this question, 140 choosing less precise inquiries such as: "Do any of you know any reason whatsoever why you cannot render a fair and impartial verdict in this case, either for the defendant or for the Commonwealth of Virginia?" 141 When the a question into racial prejudice such as the one requested "has been ruled on by the Supreme Court. I'm not going to ask that. Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, in relevant part: The court may permit the defendant or his attorney and the attorney for the government to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In the latter event the court shall permit the defendant or his attorney judge asked his questions, the prospective jurors were unaware that Smith was white.
1 42 The final jury, which consisted of eight whites and four blacks,1 4 3 convicted Turner of all three charges.144 In a separate hearing, the same jury recommended the death penalty for Turner, 145 (a) Examination. -After the prospective jurors are sworn on the voir dire, the court shall question them individually or collectively to determine whether anyone:
(1) Is related by blood or marriage to the accused or to a person against whom the alleged offense was committed; (2) Is an officer, director, agent or employee of the accused; (3) Has any interest in the trial or the outcome of the case; (4) Has acquired any information about the alleged offense or the accused from the news media or other sources and, if so, whether such information would affect his impartiality in the case; (5) Has expressed or formed any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused; (6) Has a bias or prejudice against the Commonwealth or the accused; or (7) Has any reason to believe he might not give a fair and impartial trial to the Commonwealth and the accused based solely on the law and the evidence. Thereafter, the court, or counsel with permission of the court, may examine on oath any prospective juror or may ask any question relevant to his qualifications as an impartial juror. A party objecting to ajuror may introduce competent evidence in support of the objection. VA With the exception of seven questions, all of which were asked in this case, Rule 3A:20(a) makes voir dire questioning entirely discretionary with the trial court. Unless the refusal to ask a question amounts to a denial of due process or otherwise impinges upon the right to a fair and impartial jury, the present wording of Code § 8.01-358 and Rule 3A:20(a) empowers a trial court to use its discretion in determining whether to ask questions proposed by either the Commonwealth or the defendant. Id., 273 S.E.2d at 42 (citation omitted).
151 106 S. Ct. at 1693 n.l (Powell, J., dissenting). The denial of certiorari is located at 451 U.S. 1011 (1981) . It is interesting to note thatJustice White failed to mention this earlier certiorari denial in the majority and plurality opinions. In a footnote outlining the procedural history of Turner, Justice Powell mentioned this certiorari denial in his dissenting opinion. 106 S. Ct. at 1693 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting). that the mere fact that the victim was white and the defendant was black was less likely to distort the trial than were the special factors present in Ham." Id. Furthermore, Ristaino represented a refusal by the Supreme Court "to create a per se rule requiring voir dire on racial prejudice in any case where the defendant is of a different race from the victim." Id.
The Fourth Circuit also analyzed Rosales-Lopez as support for their decision in Turner v. Bass that the interracial nature of a crime alone is not sufficient to mandate voir dire inquiry into the racial prejudices of the prospective jurors. Id. Instead, the trial court should analyze the probability of whether the jurors in a specific case will be racially or ethnically prejudiced. Id.
the charge was capital murder. 156 Turner also contended that a defendant convicted of murdering a white person receives the death penalty with more frequency, "and therefore a special circumstance is created by this likelihood." 15 7 In response, the Fourth Circuit stated:
We are of opinion that the nature of the crime or punishment itself is not a special circumstance. Nor is the fact that the victim is white and the defendant black, as Ristaino specifically so held. We are also of opinion that the fact that a larger percentage of white victims' assailants are executed than are other races is not a special circumstance.
158
Judge Phillips specially concurred in the court's holding.
159
While he expressly agreed with the result, Phillips disagreed strongly with the majority's refusal to delineate as "special circumstances" conditions which would have enabled Turner to demand voir dire questioning into the possible racial biases of the potential jurors. 160 Phillips concluded that "not only specific racial issues in the particular case but a demonstrated likelihood of racial prejudice affecting the particular jury, irrespective of specific issues, may invoke the constitutional right"' 16 1 to question prospective jurors about their potential racial biases. 16 2 Furthermore, Phillips indicated that "scientifically sound statistical evidence related to community attitudes as reflected in jury performance in sufficient samples of comparable cases" could be useful. 16 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT

A. THE MAJORITY AND PLURALITY OPINIONS
The Court stated that it granted certiorari to analyze the Fourth Circuit's holding that no constitutional guarantee of a voir dire inquiry into the potential racial prejudices of the prospective jurors existed at Turner's trial 1 6 5 The Court began its analysis by reviewing the Ristaino standard: that a black defendant accused of an interracial crime is not necessarily guaranteed voir dire inquiry into the racial prejudices of the prospective jurors. 16 6 The Court distinguished Ristaino from Turner by focusing on the fact that, unlike the defendant in Ristaino, Turner was accused of a capital offense.
67
The Court also discussed the substantial amount of discretion given to capital sentencing juries under Virginia law.' 68 By statute, Virginia courts must comply with a three-step process prior to giving a death sentence.
1 69 First, the jury must find a "probability" 170 that the defendant will continue to commit crimes of violence or that the defendant's conduct in the crime at issue was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim. 
states:
In assessing the penalty of any person convicted of an offense for which the death penalty may be imposed, a sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the court or jury shall (1) after consideration of the past criminal record of convictions of the defendant, find that there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society or that his conduct in committing the offense for which he stands charged was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim; and (2) recommend that the penalty of death be imposed. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (1983). Section 19.2-264.4(B) states, in relevant part:
Evidence which may be admissible, subject to the rules of evidence governing admissibility, may include the circumstances surrounding the offense, the history and background of the defendant, and any other facts in mitigation of the offense. Facts in mitigation may include ... [the fact that] at the time of the commission of the capital felony, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired....
Id. at § 19.2-264.4(B) (1983).
169 106 S. 
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The Court placed two limitations on the application of this rule. First, the Court, embracing Ham,' 84 gave the trial judge "discretion as to the form and number of questions on the subject, including the decision whether to question the venire individually or collectively.' t 5 Second, the Court expressly placed the burden of requesting such a voir dire inquiry on the defendant.
1 8 6
The Court, acting in plurality, next applied its holding to the specific facts in Turner.1 8 7 Due to "[t]he inadequacy of voir dire"'1 8 8 at trial, the Court vacated Turner's death sentence.' 89 This inadequate voir dire resulted in "an unacceptable risk of racial prejudice infecting the capital sentencing proceeding. "' 190 In reaching this conclusion, the Court analyzed three elements of Turner's case:' 9 ' (1) the interracial and violent nature of the crime in question; (2) the large amount ofjury discretion under the Virginia death penalty statutes; and (3) "the special seriousness of the risk of improper sentencing in a capital case."'
92
The Court did not, however, vacate the jury's conviction of Turner. 19 3 Citing Ristaino as support, the Court concluded that "[at] the guilt phase of petitioner's trial, the jury had no greater discretion than it would have had if the crime charged had been noncapital murder. ' Id. The Court carefully qualified the scope of its inquiry into the third element, noting that "[we] find it unnecessary to evaluate the statistical studies which petitioner has introduced in support of the proposition that black defendants who kill whites are executed with disproportionate frequency." Id. at n. 11. '93 Id. at 1688-89. 194 Id. at 1689. It is important to analyze two footnotes in the Court's opinion which seek to explain the reasoning behind the plurality's affirmation of the trial court's finding of guilt. In response to Justice Brennan's arguments in his partial concurrence, partial dissent, see infra notes 200-03 and accompanying text, Justice White wrote that
[w]e are unpersuaded by Justice Brennan's view that "the opportunity for racial prejudice to taint the jury process is ... equally a factor at the guilt [and sentencing] phase[s] of a bifurcated capital trial .... As we see it, the risk of racial bias at sentencing hearings is of an entirely different order, because the decisions that sen-
B. JUSTICE BRENNAN'S PARTIAL CONCURRENCE, PARTIAL DISSENT
Justice Brennan agreed with the Court's holding that Turner's death sentence should be vacated. 19 5 He conditioned his agreement, however, by arguing for a more inclusive standard as to when voir dire questioning into the racial prejudices of the prospective jurors should occur. 1 9 6 Justice Brennan, relying on Justice Marshall's dissent in the 1973 Ross v. Massachusetts certiorari denial, argued that voir dire inquiry into possible racial biases should be guaranteed "whenever a violent interracial crime has been committed."' 9 7 In contrast, the Turner majority held that such an inquiry is appropriate only in a situation involving "a capital defendant accused of an interracial crime."' 9 8 Justice Brennan justified his inclusion of noncapital defendants accused of interracial crimes in stating:
The reality of race relations in this country is such that we simply may not presume impartiality, and the risk of bias runs especially high when members of a community serving on a jury are to be confronted with disturbing evidence of criminal conduct that is often terrifying and abhorrent.' 9 9 Justice Brennan argued further that the Court should vacate tencingjurors must make involve far more subjective judgments than when they are deciding guilt or innocence. 106 S. Ct. at n.12 (quoting id. at 1691 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)).
In Part Two of the Court's opinion, the plurality responded to the dissent, noting: NotwithstandingJustice Powell's attempt to minimize the significance of the discretion entrusted to the jury at a capital sentencing hearing .... we are convinced that such discretion gives greater opportunity for racial prejudice to operate than is present when the jury is restricted to factfinding. This, together with the special seriousness with which we view the risk of racial prejudice influencing a capital sentencing decision, are what distinguish this case from Ristaino. Id. at 1688 n.8; see infra notes 214-17 and accompanying text for an analysis ofJustice Powell's arguments to the contrary.
195 106 S. Ct. at 1689 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Accordingly, Justice Brennan stated his belief that the death sentence qualifies as cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The eighth amendment to the Constitution states that "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Turner's conviction. 20 0 Relying on the plurality's warnings of the dangers of racially biased jurors in capital sentencing hearings, 20 1 Justice Brennan stated that "the Court never explains why these biases should be of less concern at the guilt phase than at the sentencing phase." 20 2 Justice Brennan further challenged the plurality by stating that:
[a] racially biased juror sits with blurred vision and impaired sensibilities and is incapable of fairly making the myriad decisions that each juror is called upon to make in the course of a trial. To put it simply, he cannot judge because he has prejudged. This is equally true at the trial on guilt as at the hearing on sentencing. . In reaching this conclusion, Justice Brennan stated that "the Court disavows the logic of its own reasoning in denying petitioner Turner a new trial on the issue of his guilt." Id. at 1690 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Furthermore, Justice Brennan argued that "the distinction between the jury's role at a guilt trial and its role at a sentencing hearing is a distinction without substance in so far as juror bias is concerned .
.. " Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 201 Id. at 1691 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). See supra notes 174-78 and accompanying text for the plurality's language. 202 106 S. Ct. at 1691 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Brennan furthered his argument by asking the plurality the following rhetorical questions:
[M]ight not [a racially prejudiced] juror be influenced by those same prejudices in deciding whether, for example, to credit or discredit white witnesses as opposed to black witnesses at the guilt phase? Might not those same racial fears that would incline a juror to favor death not also incline a juror to favor conviction? ... Does the Court really mean to suggest that the constitutional entitlement to an impartial jury attaches only at the sentencing phase? Does the Court really believe that racial biases are turned on and off in the course of one criminal prosecution?
Id. at 1691-92 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
The Third Circuit in United States v. Robinson also addressed the critical importance of an unbiased jury throughout the trial process. 485 F.2d 1157. The Robinson defendant, who was black, was accused of failing to comply with the requirements of the 1967 Selective Service Act. Id. at 1158. The trial judge refused to allow defense counsel to ask the prospective jurors whether they would give equal credibility to witnesses of different races. Id. The Third Circuit found this refusal in error, stating:
The government contends that Aldridge and Ham are not controlling in this case because the specific question suggested by counsel dealt with credibility of witnesses based upon their race rather than with prejudice against the defendant as such based upon his race. Aside from the fact that the district court's reaction to the question effectively put an end to any exploration of the area of racial prejudice, we think any such fine distinction between prejudice against witnesses based upon race and prejudice against the defendant based upon race would be pettifogging. the Court's vacating of Turner's death sentence and dissented from the decision to affirm the jury's conviction. 20 4 In analyzing the internal conflicts of the Turner plurality's holding, Justice Marshall focused on the actual application of the Court's decision. Specifically, he noted that post-Turner defendants accused of interracial capital crimes will be entitled to demand voir dire questioning into the potential racial biases of the jury panel members. 20 5 If the same jury rules on conviction and sentencing, then the probability of a racially unbiased jury throughout the entire proceeding increases. 2 0 6 This guarantee of a bias-free jury was not applied in Turner, however, since the Court chose to vacate only Turner's death sentence, 20 7 and Turner's conviction, which was decided by a possibly racially biased jury, was affirmed. 20 8 As a result, Justice Marshall concluded that the Turner result is "incongruous and fundamentally unfair." The dissent viewed the Turner holding as creating a per se rule which was unacceptable in light of what Justice Powell viewed as the minimal amount of discretion exercised by jurors in the sentencing process. 2 14 Referring to the same state statutes which the plurality used to highlight the large amount of juror discretion allowed in Virginia, 2 1 5 as well as another statute not mentioned in the majority or plurality opinions, 2 1 6 Justice Powell stated that such "significant limitations on the jury's exercise of sentencing discretion illustrates why the Court's per se rule is wholly unfounded." 2 17
Justice Powell also embraced the reasoning, though not the result, ofJustice Brennan's attack on the plurality's double standard in vacating only Turner's death sentence and not his conviction. Just as the trial judge's charge at the guilt phase instructs the jurors that they may consider only the evidence in the case and that they must determine if the prosecution has established each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, the charge at the penalty phase directs the jurors to focus solely on considerations relevant to determination of appropriate punishment and to decide if the prosecution has established beyond a reasonable doubt factors warranting imposition of death. Id. at 1696 (Powell, J., dissenting). The dissentingJustices also focused on the actual trial proceedings in Turner, concluding that the potential racial biases of the prospective jurors were not at issue. 2 20 Justice Powell found two facts significant in reaching this conclusion. First, he focused on the importance of the fact that the twelve person jury consisted of four blacks, one of whom served as foreman. 2 2 ' Second, he emphasized that the statistical evidence presented by defense counsel did not contain specific data for the state of Virginia. 22 2 This data asserted that more black defendants accused of murdering whites are sentenced to death than are non-white capital defendants. It is not, after all, the prospective jurors who are on trial in the cases that come before the courts. It can be imagined that, as counsel seek more and more information to aid in filling the jury box with persons of a particular type whom they believe to be well disposed toward their clients, prospective jurors will be less than willing to serve if they know that inquiry into their essentially private concerns will be pressed. Id. at 140.
tions militate against the divisive assumption-as a per se rule-that justice in a court of law may turn upon the pigmentation of skin ... 226 In establishing the new rule, the Court acknowledged the fact that racial prejudice may affect the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury. 22 7 The Court's limited standard, furthermore, resembles the Aldridge Court's heightened concern with protecting the sixth amendment rights of capital defendants.
28
The Court, however, refused to delineate race as a "special circumstance" which unconditionally guarantees voir dire inquiry into racial prejudice. 22 9 Such a refusal is reflected in the Court's limited application of its per se rule to defendants accused of interracial capital offenses. No application of the espoused per se inquiry into racial bias was mandated in cases of non-capital interracial crimes, such as interracial rape, which has traditionally evoked such prejudice. 23 0 Furthermore, the limited holding does not encompass either intraracial capital crimes or intraracial non-capital crimes where the racial bias of a white juror towards a black defendant could remain unaffected regardless of the fact that the victim is black.
In addition to its very limited scope, another major downfall of the Turner holding is its inconsistent application. All post-Turner defendants accused of interracial capital crimes are guaranteed voir dire examination into the potential racial biases of prospective jurors if they so request. Turner, however, did not receive this guarantee since the Court refused to vacate his conviction. The plurality seemingly ignored the fact that the same potentially racially biased jury which sentenced Turner to die had also found him guilty of capital murder. Justice White attempted to use the large amount of statutorily granted juror discretion in the sentencing phase to argue that racial bias was more likely in Turner's sentencing procedure than during the conviction phase of his trial. 23 1 True racial prejudice, however, could easily withstand the smallest grant ofjuror dis- 
740
[Vol. 77 cretion allowed by law, especially when such biases remain wholly unchallenged during the voir dire. Therefore, it is direct questioning, rather than an institutional reliance on statutorily limited juror discretion, which will produce racially unbiased juries. The Turner Court followed the United States v. Booker rule of ignoring the racial make-up of the jury in determining whether racial prejudice actually affected Turner's trial proceedings. 2 32 It is apparent, therefore, that the sixth amendment guarantee of an impartial jury does not include the right to have jurors from the same racial or ethnic group as the defendant on the jury panel.
3
Post-Turner trial judges continue to have substantial discretion in cases involving interracial capital crimes. The Turner Court refused to place limitations on the number of questions about racial prejudice that the prospective jurors should be asked, the wording of such questions, and whether such inquiries should be made on a collective or an individual basis. 23 4 This large amount of discretion will enable trial judges to limit dramatically the scope of voir dire inquiry into racial prejudice in all interracial capital cases. 23 5 Since the per se inquiry required by Turner is limited to defendants accused of interracial capital crimes, even less protection from the trial judge's discretion will be provided for non-capital defendants and intraracial capital defendants.
Additionally, the Turner Court directly undermined its 1981 decision in Rosales-Lopez by altering one portion of the three-part standard announced in that case. 2 36 After Turner, a defendant must still request voir dire inquiry into racial prejudice and must also be accused of an interracial crime to be guaranteed such inquiry. 23 7 The defendant, however, must now be accused of a capital offense, not just a violent crime, as required in Rosales-Lopez. 238 Justice Rehnquist forecasted this distinction in his Rosales-Lopez concurrence. The resulting Turner standard will effectively eliminate the right of defendants who are accused of interracial crimes which are violent, but not capital, to demand voir dire inquiry into the racial biases of the prospective jurors. Furthermore, no protection from juror bias is afforded black defendants accused of intraracial capital or intraracial non-capital offenses. Such a result will protect the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury only if it can be shown that a white juror who would be racially prejudiced against a black defendant accused of an interracial capital offense would not also harbor a similar bias against the same black defendant accused of an interracial non-capital offense or an intraracial capital or non-capital offense.
VI. CONCLUSION
The per se rule established by Turner is wholly inadequate to guarantee an impartial jury for defendants who are not protected by the decision's limited scope. The Supreme Court's narrow holding implies that only defendants accused of interracial capital crimes deserve sixth amendment protection. In turn, the racial prejudices affecting the juries at the trials of defendants accused of interracial non-capital crimes and all intraracial crimes remain unchallenged.
It cannot be effectively argued that less potential for a racially prejudiced jury exists in crimes not covered by the Turner decision. The Court implies, however, that the results of a trial affected by racial prejudice will be less severe in a case other than one involving an interracial capital crime. Yet, as ChiefJustice Hughes stated fiftyfive years prior to the Turner decision, if the jurors "were found to be impartial, no harm would be done in permitting the question; but if any one of them was shown to entertain a prejudice which would preclude his rendering a fair verdict, a gross injustice would be perpetrated in allowing him to sit. ' ' 240 The finality of the death penalty demands that heightened care be exercised to guarantee a fair trial for capital defendants. Yet, an established mandate is necessary to guarantee the existence of an impartial jury for each defendant whose sixth amendment guarantee of a fair trial will be superseded by jurors whose racial prejudices remain unchallenged.
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